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Kathleen M. Kelly*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to succinctly describe the context for presentations
at the April 19,1997, Symposium on Current Issues in the Use of Contractual Arbit-
ration sponsored by McGeorge School of Law's Institute for Legislative Practice.
At the time of the Symposium, Senate Bill No. 19, pending before the California
Legislature, proposed adding the following grounds for vacating arbitration awards:
1286.5(a) In addition to any remedies and rights available under sections
1286.2 and 1286.4, a court shall vacate an arbitration award if it determines
all of the following exists: (1) The award is the result of legal error by the
arbitrator that has resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice. (2) The agreement or
contract with the consumer party that contains a mandatory arbitration
provision is in a standardized contract drafted by or on behalf of the non-
consumer party. (3) The petition to vacate is filed by the consumer party.
Assessing the merits of this and other proposed legislation requires knowledge of
current limits on the reach of state law and consideration of competing policy
arguments bearing on either federal or state reform. This context paper will sum-
marize the following topics addressed at the Symposium:
II. Importance of the Issues
III. History and Federal Status Quo - Present federal authority greatly restricts
the prerogatives left to state legislative action. An understanding of its
basic contours is necessary before any proposals for state reform can be
addressed.
IV. Contexts for Possible State Reform - Despite the preemptive effect of
current federal law, some possible contexts for state reform can be
identified that arguably do not run afoul of federal law.
V. Central Contentions Bearing on Possible Reforms
* Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, McGeorge School of Law, University of the
Pacific. J.D., 1976, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley; B.A., 1973, Yale University.
1998 IMcGeorge Symposium On Contractual Arbitration
II. IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES
Although no one may practice as a lawyer or medical doctor in any of the
United States without satisfying extensive regulatory requirements, an arbitrator
may offer him or herself for hire with no public showing of qualifications and may
issue a binding determination of claims over malpractice, other personal injuries,
significant property loss, violation of statutory rights, and other "high stakes"
disputes with no explanation of the basis for the outcome. Up until the last ten to
fifteen years, this state of affairs engendered little to no public clamor because
arbitration flourished primarily in contexts where two equally powerful and
informed parties chose arbitration as preferable to litigation. Market choice assured
that only those arbitrators who served well continued to serve.'
In recent years, recurring defendants unhappy with jury verdicts have promoted
arbitration in a boundless array of matters. Banks insert notices with monthly
statements stating that further use of accounts will be deemed assent to arbitration
for binding resolution of any consumer claims.2 The multi-inch stack of papers
signed upon buying a home will generally now include agreements to resolve all
disputes with the seller, agent, or contractor through arbitration. It is not infrequent
for doctors to present new patients not only with forms seeking medical history and
insurance information, but also arbitration agreements. These typically incorporate
rules of entities such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA), rules which
neither the doctor nor the patient is likely to have seen. Courts concerned with
docket pressure have largely upheld agreements signed in these and similar
contexts.
Consumer advocates are crying foul. They urge that imposing arbitration
against parties who are unwitting, or understand but perceive no choice, is eroding
access to justice. They relate anecdotes of arbitration procedures that seem stacked
against the consumer. For example, a home purchaser with a complaint about a
construction deficiency found himself in arbitration, and on the day the arbitrator
was scheduled to inspect, the insurance adjuster who had initially denied the claim
instead arrived and related what he saw over the phone to the arbitrator in a
friendly, jesting conversation.3
Industry spokespersons reply that current law is sufficient to address abuses
conveyed by such anecdotes, and that ultimate good for all consumers ensues from
the cost savings achieved when formal litigation expense is avoided.
Both sides are prone to make sweeping characterizations regarding the current
state of affairs. The McGeorge Symposium is designed to gather speakers with
expertise in law, empirical research that tests the law's assumptions, and direct
experience with arbitration as it is currently practiced in multiple industries. This
1. See discussion infra Part HI.B.
2. Ellie Winninghoff, In Arbitration, Pitfalls for Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1994, at A3.
3. Id.
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issue publishes the research and analysis of two key participants, and this paper
notes areas for further empirical inquiry, the need for which was highlighted by
Symposium discussion.
III. HISTORY AND FEDERAL STATUS Quo
A. The Reach of Current Federal Law
Two recent Supreme Court decisions give the Federal Arbitration Act (first
adopted in 1925) sweeping application to claims subject only to state court juris-
diction. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. ,4 the Court considered the application of an
Alabama statute invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements to a 'Termite
Protection Plan" with a consumer. The Court had previously held that the FAA
creates substantive law applicable in state as well as federal court.5 In Allied-Bruce
Terminix, it held that the reach of that law extends to the limits of Congress'
Commerce Clause power. The Alabama statute was determined to be preempted.
Upon observing that the arbitration agreement in that case evidenced a transaction
involving commerce, the Court noted both the multi-state nature of the corporate
parties and the fact that materials used in performance of the contract came from
outside Alabama. Since one of these conditions will be met in most all commercial
or medical transactions, the reach of the FAA is great.
In Doctor's Assocs.,6 the Court held that a Montana statute requiring special
notice that an agreement includes an arbitration clause was preempted. The statute
specified that notice of an arbitration clause's inclusion must be typed in capital
letters on the first page of any contract as the price for enforcement. The Court held
that states may not invalidate arbitration agreements applicable to activities
involving commerce under state laws applicable only to arbitration agreements.7
Because these precedents are so recent, reformers will not likely persuade the
Supreme Court to alter its course any time soon. Congress and state legislatures are
more promising arenas for those who seek reform. Since outstanding judicial pre-
cedent influences the politics of change even in the legislative arena, however, those
who advocate for reforms at the federal level should be mindful of why federal
precedent has evolved as it has. For the foreseeable future, those who advocate for
4. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
5. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). This ruling has significant consequences since, although
§ 2 of the FAA providing for enforcement of arbitration agreements is broadly stated, § 4 only provides for federal
actions to compel where the dispute would be subject to federal court jurisdiction in the absence of the agreement
to arbitrate. Section 2 has not been construed as independently creating federal question jurisdiction.
6. 517 U.S. 581 (1996).
7. A 1996 inventory found that, at that time, four states excluded consumer contracts from some laws
otherwise favoring arbitration, nine states precluded arbitration in insurance contracts, and two states in addition
to Montana required special notice of an arbitration clause. Joseph T. Mclaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends
in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905, 924-25 (1996).
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change at the state level must cast their efforts in a manner most likely to withstand
federal preemption.
The remainder of Section I provides a brief synopsis of the federal history.
Section IV summarizes issues surrounding avoidance of federal preemption highly
important to those who advocate for state reform.
B. Synopsis of Relevant History8
1. Early Success Stories
In common law jurisdictions, the longest standing uses of binding arbitration
withoutfrequent complaints of injustice have been in two contexts: (1) international
business disputes; and (2) labor disputes. As to the first, in England, the Crown
wished to encourage participation of itinerant merchants in trade fairs.9 As part of
trade fairs chartered by the crown, therefore, peers redressed complaints among
tradespeople using "a comprehensive body of norms created by the merchants and
distinct from the common law." ° Although this early form of arbitration was only
voluntary in that the King gave notice that participation at a trade fair would make
a merchant subject to it, merchants embraced the system because:
(1) it avoided problems about domestic exercise of jurisdiction over
foreigners (which meant that civil courts were really not an option);
(2) it was efficient because matters were decided by those with experience
and knowledge about general mercantile expectations (the "Law
Merchant"); and
(3) its speed coupled with the King's endorsement for enforcement enabled
resolution before everyone dispersed and moved on to the next trade fair.
Although the "Law Merchant" was eventually absorbed into the common law,
parties in international commercial transactions have continued to favor arbitration
as a means to minimize fear about home-court advantage and to maximize
efficiency through the use of specialists. This led to adoption of the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards by the
U.N. Economic and Social Council in 1958, and final accession thereto by the
United States in 1970.11
8. For a more thorough yet succinct summary of the relevant history, see IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATON, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992).
9. See, e.g., LIBERALBUS 257 (1419) (declaring "[w]hereas the King doth will that no foreign merchants
shall be delayed by a long series of pleadings, the King doth command that the Wardens and Sheriffs shall hear
daily the pleas of such foreigners ... and then speedy redress be given unto them").
10. IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS § 4.2.1 (1995).
11. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-08 (West 1970).
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The second context in which arbitration has historically flourished is also one
in which the civil court was initially not an option. Neither statutory nor common
law has generally addressed the appropriate terms and conditions for employment
of any individual (apart from the rather modem specification of minimums by both
federal and state law). They have been fixed by action of the free market, including
strikes and lockouts. Throughout modem legal history, however, there have been
occasions where all parties have desired to avoid the economic damage these
weapons can cause and have agreed to arbitration. In our own history, as early as
1786, the New York Chamber of Commerce organized arbitration for wages of
seamen to keep commerce flowing.
1 2
Once terms are established and reflected in an employment contract or
collective bargaining agreement, court becomes at least theoretically possible as a
forum for redressing claims of breach. As labor strength grew at the beginning of
the century, however, unions did not favor this option in the view that pro-business
politics were controlling judicial appointments. Unions sought contract clauses
calling for arbitration over contract violations. Employers in industries with strong
unions were prone to agree because experience taught that unions disinclined to go
to court would lead work stoppages over contract grievances disrupting production.
Arbitration was better than relying on injunctions and damage suits to combat work
stoppages.
As reliance upon arbitration grew, arbitrators developed norms' 3 controlling
their decisions very akin to the "Law Merchant" that informally evolved to control
the affairs of England's medieval merchants. This lent predictability to bargaining
parties' affairs. At its best, continued use of arbitrators who are familiar with typical
labor arbitration decisions facilitates common case-assessment (thus enabling settle-
ments) and focuses presentations when cases must be heard. Thus, here, as in the
case of international commercial disputes, arbitration has flourished with the assent
of affected parties because:
(1) court is not a realistic alternative;
(2) specialized decision-makers are desirable; and
(3) the desire to keep commerce flowing warrants putting a high premium on
expedition.
2. The Initial Stance of the Courts
Many historians allege that English common law was initially inhospitable to
arbitration because judges feared that they would lose fees by ouster of their juris-
12. FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948).
13. For a compilation of those norms after considerable evolution. see F. & E. ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION
WORKS (1985).
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diction. 14 While this rationale had no factual foundation in the United States, many
early decisions of both state and federal courts displayed hostility toward
arbitration:
The courts will scarcely permit any other body of men to even partially
perform judicial work, and will never permit absorption of all the business
growing out of disputes over a contract by any body of arbitrators, unless
compelled to such action by statute. 5
Although some courts voiced a more supportive view when asked to enforce an
award, the courts generally did not compel parties to arbitrate if they resisted com-
pliance with an arbitration agreement before submission. Seeking damages for
breach of an arbitration agreement was ineffectual.'
6
Despite the unavailability of judicial enforcement, some domestic business
interests became increasingly reliant upon voluntary compliance with arbitration
agreements as the exclusive means for resolving disputes in the period leading to
the first part of this century. The Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York
was a leader in creating internal procedures encouraging adoption of and com-
pliance with arbitration agreements.1 7 Following the model of early international
tradespeople, business interests were pleased to resolve their differences privately,
quickly, and by reliance upon business norms, in order to keep commerce flowing,
rather than public law. In close-knit environments, honor, fear of harming future
relations, or the threat of exclusion from a trade association provided enough in-
centive to comply with arbitration agreements.
3. Development of Modern Federal Law
As business boomed and the range of deals expanded beyond local controls in
the hey day at the beginning of the century, compliance issues arose. Those who
could influence the legislative agenda of business still endorsed arbitration as the
forum most effective for resolving differences with a minimum of interruption to
commercial aims. The business lobby, therefore, first led statutory reform in New
York, and then worked through the American Bar Association, 8 on the successful
drive ultimately resulting in adoption of the Federal Arbitration Act.1
9
14. MACNIL, E TAL., supra note 10, § 4.1.2 n. 4.
15. United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1010-11 (S.D.N.Y.
1915).
16. MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 20.
17. William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A BriefSurvey, 1956
WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 211-18.
18. MACNEIL, supra note 8, at 84.
19. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 (West 1998).
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Present scholarship reflects a lively debate concerning whether the FAA's
adopters intended for it to apply in state court with the full reach of Congress'
Commerce Clause power.20 Whatever the original intent may have been, a con-
fluence of factors has caused the Supreme Court to increasingly favor contractual
arbitration by coming to the aid-of those who seek to enforce arbitration agreements
or awards. Phenomena that arose shortly after adoption of the FAA are relevant.
The New Deal increased exponentially the quantity of federal law and potential
federal judicial work. Legislative initiatives included the Wagner Act,2' which
sought to encourage collective bargaining as the best means to minimize labor strife
that could potentially disrupt the necessary flow of goods. Adoption of this strategy
rejected prior efforts to fix fair wages by governmental action or stop strife with
judicial injunctions. These more interventionist approaches were abandoned in
favor of enforcing collective bargaining agreements.Y The philosophy that labor-
management disputants should be empowered to solve their own problems
warranted development of precedent resolving all doubts in favor of arbitration.
Initially, brakes were applied to this trend when important interests protected by
other statutes appeared to be at stake. Ultimately, however, precedent developed in
the labor-management setting provided a foundation for increasingly enthusiastic
federal endorsement of arbitration over the later part of this century as a critical tool
in avoiding court congestion.2 The following summarizes key Supreme Court
precedents in the evolution:
A pre-dispute arbitration agreement allegedly covering consumer claims for
civil liability under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 for mis-
representation in the sale of securities was void under Section 14 of the
Act.2
4
A court must not deny a petition to compel arbitration because the claim
seems patently frivolous. If the claim on its face is governed by the agree-
ment, arbitration must be compelled.'
The rule of United Steelworkers applies even where the grievance does not
rely upon any explicit clause within the collective bargaining agreement.
The request to compel arbitration may only be denied if it may be said with
"positive assurance" that the arbitration clause cannot be construed so as
20. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternhight Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debundng the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
21. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 1935).
22. Collectivebargaining agreements were apt to include arbitration clauses, as discussed supra, Part I .B.1.
23. See Sternmlight, supra note 20, at660 n.126 (noting a 1982 address by Chief Justice Berger as a harbinger
of this trend).
24. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
25. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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to embrace the dispute. All doubts must be resolved in favor of coverage,
given the national policy favoring arbitration as a substitute for industrial
strife.2
6
Courts should not review the merits of an arbitration award after its
issuance, and arbitrators have no obligation to give their reasons for an
award.
2 7
Wilko v. Swan should not be followed in a case between international
disputants involving claimed violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. In this setting, arbitration agreements protect parties
fearful of hostile forums and afford predictability. Failure of enforcement
would undermine the orderliness needed for international business trans-
actions.2
An employee who arbitrated his discharge under a collective bargaining
agreement's grievance procedure did not thereby forego his ability to sue
under Title VII claiming discrimination because the contractual rights at
issue before the arbitrator were distinct from the plaintiff's statutory
rights.
29
The reasoning of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver applies to claims under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (specifying minimum wages and conditions).3"
A federal district court should not stay a petition to compel arbitration
where the issue of arbitrability is pending before a state court. It should
promptly decide the issue of arbitrability because of Congress' intent to
"move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration
as quickly and easily as possible."
31
Section 2 of the FAA (declaring that arbitration agreements in contracts
arising from transactions that "involve commerce" are enforceable on the
same basis as all other contracts) creates substantive law applicable in both
federal and state courts.3 2 Thus, there is a federal policy against disfavoring
26. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
27. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
28. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
29. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
30. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
31. Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
32. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 29
arbitration agreements applicable in both federal and state court whenever
commerce is involved.
Antitrust claims of a Puerto Rico corporation against a joint venture
between Japanese and Swiss corporations are subject to an arbitration
clause in the distribution and sales agreements even though they contained
no express reference to statutory claims and the specified forum was
arbitration by the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. Addressing
the capacity of the courts to assure accomplishment of the public purposes
served by federal antitrust laws, the Court observed that despite the
deference required after issuance of an award, a court could assure itself
that the tribunal "took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually
decided them."
33
Section 2 of the FAA preempts California Labor Code section 229
providing that actions for the collection of wages may be maintained
"without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate"
where the "involving commerce" requirement of the FAA is met.34 Section
229 is contrary to the federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
awards.
Customer agreements providing for arbitration of any controversy relating
to their accounts apply to alleged violations of the antifraud provisions in
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act only prohibits waiver of the Act's substantive obligations.
Any view that the federal judicial forum is a substantive protection is based
on an out-moded mistrust of arbitration. RICO claims were also found
arbitrable.35
Wilko v. Swan is overruled. A pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims
under the Securities Act of 1933 is enforceable.36
A former securities representative's claims under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) are subject to an arbitration clause in
the registration agreement he signed. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver is
limited to the collective bargaining context. "[T]he burden is on Gilmer to
33. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,638 (1985).
34. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
35. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
36. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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show that Congress intended to preclude waiver of a judicial forum for
ADEA claims.
3 7
The interstate commerce language in section 2 of the FAA should be read
broadly to encompass the furthest reach of Congress' Commerce Clause
power. Thus, a state (here, Alabama) may not apply a statute making pre-
dispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable to a contract bet-
ween a multi-state company (using materials coming from outside
Alabama) and a.consumer for termite protection.3
An award containing punitive damages should be enforced even though the
arbitration agreement's choice-of-law clause pointed to New York, where
under state law, only courts may issue punitive damages. The choice-of-law
clause did not unequivocally exclude punitive damages.39
The FAA preempts a state statute requiring "notice that a contract is subject
to arbitration" to be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of
the contract."' Such a restriction cannot be applied solely to contracts
requiring arbitration. In contracts involving commerce, states may only
decline enforcement of arbitration agreements on the grounds of "generally
applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress or unconscionability. '41
Given the recency and vehemence of current federal authority seeking to
preservejudicial resources through favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements,
reform at the federal level is improbable in the foreseeable future. "Congress has
committed to the SEC the task of ensuring that the federal rights established by the
Securities Act are not compromised by inadequate arbitration procedures" through
oversight of the NYSE and NASD.42 Any organized consumer group seeking to
lobby for exclusion of any other federal statutory right from arbitration enforcement
would have to fight the perception, fostered by the above summarized Supreme
Court cases, that the status quo helps guard against an absolute necessity to fund an
expanded federal judiciary.
Those who favor reform, therefore, must necessarily consider what possibilities
the preemptive effect of the FAA leaves open at the state level.
37. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
38. Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
39. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
40. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
41. Id at 1656 (emphasis added).
42. Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282,286 (9th Cir. 1988). For a recent discussion of
those efforts, commenting on the 1996 NASD Taskforce Report on Securities Arbitration Reform, see Joel
Seligman, The Quiet Revolution: Securities Arbitration Confronts the Hard Questions, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 327
(1996).
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IV. CONTEXTS FOR POSSIBLE STATE REFORM
Government regulation may affect arbitration: (1) when one party resists
compliance with an arbitration agreement and the other seeks to enforce use of
arbitration; or (2) the party aggrieved by an award seeks judicial relief from it. The
discussion which follows will outline critical authorities bearing upon the viability
of possible state reforms at either juncture and highlight issues addressed by
Symposium participants.
A. Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotta unequivocally affirms that, "generally
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening section 2 [of the
FAA]." '43 Seemingly, this allows states full leeway to develop, by court decision or
statute, doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability so as to afford greater pro-
tection for consumers unwittingly entering into arbitration agreements. The central
caveat is that doctrines developed must apply generally and not disfavor arbitration
commitments as contrasted with other contractual obligations. The Montana notice
requirement, which fell to preemption in Doctor's Associates, was deemed flawed
because it imposed an extra hurdle before enforcement of an arbitration agreement
that was not applicable to contracts generally.
The leading California case expounding upon the doctrines of adhesion and
unconscionability as they apply to arbitration agreements is Graham v. Scissor-Tail,
Inc.44 The court defined an adhesion contract as one imposed by a party with
superior bargaining strength when the other party had no effective opportunity to
reject it.4s It noted that characterizing a contract as "adhesive" is not necessarily
pejorative since efficiency dictates the use of many form agreements. The adhesive
contract warrants scrutiny, however, to avoid "oppression and overreaching." 46 The
contract at issue in the case was found adhesive even though the complaining party
was a sophisticated promoter because the other party was constrained by member-
ship in the American Federation of Musicians to view certain clauses as non-
negotiable.
After finding the contract adhesive, the court identified two judicially imposed
limitations on enforcement: (1) Is the contract outside the reasonable expectations
of the weaker or "adhering party?" and (2) Pursuant to "a principle of equity
applicable to all contracts generally," 47 is the contract unduly oppressive or "uncon-
43. 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1656(1996).
44. 28 Cal. 3d 807, 623 P.2d 165, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1981).
45. 1L at 817, 623 P.2d at 171, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
46. Id. at 818, 623 P.2d at 171, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
47. lad at 820, 623 P.2d at 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
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scionable?" A "yes" to either question forecloses enforcement. The court observed
that both notice provisions and "the extent to which the contract in question may be
said to be one affecting the public interest" 48 should influence the assessment of
"reasonable expectations." Upon discussing the unconscionability analysis, the
court reiterated that "[c]ontracts having a demonstrable public service aspect...
may be deemed unconscionable on broad grounds of public policy. '49 After alluding
to "minimum levels of integrity" and "the common law right of fair procedure," the
court held that a petition to compel arbitration should be denied where the clear
effect of the contractual procedure will be "to deny the resisting party a fair
opportunity to present his position."' On the facts of the case, a process in which
the American Federation of Musicians decided disputes was found unconscionable.
In recent applications of Graham v. Scissor-Tail, California courts have held
that: (1) a one-sided trial de novo right in an arbitration agreement applicable to
medical malpractice claims rendered it unconscionable;5 and (2) an employment
agreement in which the employee's statutory remedies were greatly curtailed while
the employer's were embellished was unconscionable.5 2 These arbitration agree-
ments evidenced transactions "involving commerce" as defined in current federal
precedents.
To what extent do these precedents square with Doctor's Associates and to what
extent do they point out possible turf for further clarity and consumer protection
through statutory reform? One Symposium participant has argued that the Montana
result found invalid in Doctor's Associates could not be achieved through reliance
upon unconscionability law rather than a statute specifically requiring notice of an
arbitration clause because nothing in the FAA justifies a distinction between
common law and statutory law.53 However, Doctor's Associates declared that
Montana's sin was singling out arbitration for treatment different from all other
commitments which might be scrutinized as unconscionable. If singling out
arbitration for unique treatment is the mortal sin, then may a state (with application
to disputes covered by the FAA's broad reach):
Provide by statute that all forum selection clauses (or as in the case above,
jury waivers) must be in bold face at the front of a contract? 54
48. Id. at 820 n.18, 623 P.2d at 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
49. Id. at 821, n.20, 623 P.2d at 173, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
50. Id. at 824-26,623 P.2d at 175-76, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
51. Saika v. Gold, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1074,56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138. Either side could seek trial de novo if the
award exceeded $25,000. The court found that this would rarely serve patients well but always gave doctors the
ability to escape unfavorable awards.
52. Stirlen v. Supercuts. Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138.
53. Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31
WAKEFORESTL. REV. 1001, 1015 (1996).
54. Symposium participants differed regarding the practical utility of such warnings and this is a front for
possible empirical work.
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Specify by statute baseline procedures which must be in place in order to
afford the "common law right of fair procedure" alluded to in Graham v.
Scissor-Tail as necessary before any forum selection clause will be
enforced? 55
Literally, such possible measures do not single out arbitration, although concededly,
arbitration would be the primary forum affected.
B. Review of Awards
Given the preemptive effect of the FAA, a state may not adopt any conflicting
general review standard for arbitration awards and apply it to arbitrations within the
FAA's broad reach. The FAA allows denial of enforcement only in cases of: (1)
corruption or fraud; (2) evident partiality; '(3) arbitrator misconduct, such as im-
proper refusal to postpone a hearing or receive evidence; or (4) an award exceeding
the powers conferred by the parties' definition of the dispute submitted.56 Consistent
with the trend of federal deference to arbitration summarized above, these grounds
have been narrowly construed.57
However, the Supreme Court has not treated the FAA, standing alone, as dis-
positive of review standards where the matters arbitrated include statutorily created
rights protecting public as well as private interests. In such an instance, the recent
decisions of the Court have proceeded on the basis that the FAA creates a strong
policy favoring arbitrability of disputes. It has also left open the possibility of
Congress "trumping" the FAA with expression of explicit and specific intent in
another statute limiting the ability *of parties to contractually waive court enforce-
ment of its protections. It has posed the issue as whether "Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue," which might
be established by an "inherent conflict between arbitration and the statutes's under-
lying purposes."5' 8 In the present federal wave of enthusiasm for arbitration, the
55. A Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations appointed by the U.S. Secretary of
Labor issued a Report and Recommendations in 1994 calling for a core of protections in arbitration of employment
disputes. They included: (1) a neutral arbitrator who knows the applicable law; (2) a simple method for the
employee to secure information essential to present his/her claim; (3) a fair method of cost-sharing; (4) the right
to independent representation; (5) remedies comparable to those afforded by litigation; (6) a written opinion; and
(7) sufficientjudicial review to assure a result consonant with governing law. At present, industry compliance upon
drafting arbitration agreements is the only device for achieving these goals.
56. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 1970). California's general statutory grounds for vacation of an arbitration award
are comparable, although phrased and ordered somewhat differently. CAL CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 1286.2 (West
Supp. 1997).
57. Such narrow construction of statutory grounds for review of arbitration awards is also the current
approach of the California Supreme Court. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal. 4th 362, 885 P.2d
994,36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581 (1994) (holding that an award should be upheld so long as it was "even arguably" based
on the contract).
58. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 482 U.S. at 227.
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Supreme Court has not found such intent in any federal statute. At least one lower
federal court, however, has found that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
affords employees a nonwaivable right of reasonable access to a neutral forum,
rendering it essential that an employer compelling arbitration pay the arbitrator's
fees.59
Do state legislatures have the same capacity to countermand the FAA regarding
enforcement mechanisms for particular statutorily created rights? Only one week
after its discussion of federal statutory intent potentially overriding the FAA in
McMahon, the Supreme Court seems to have said "no" in Perry v. Thomas.60 Upon
ruling that the FAA preempted California Labor Code Section 229, the Court
recalled words from Southland Corp. v. Keating to the effect that, "in enacting
Section 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration.,,6' Arguably, this precedent creates an anomaly: In the face of the FAA,
Congress may still deem judicial enforcement essential to accomplish the purposes
of a statutory right it creates, yet the states do not have the same prerogative
regarding statutory rights they create. Anomalous or not, the precedent is only ten
years old and hence would be challenging to reverse. Congressional recognition that
the states creating new statutory rights ought to have the prerogative to control
forum of enforcement might be a sufficiently narrow amendment of the FAA as
interpreted to overcome political hurdles.
Of course, states may be less deferential to arbitration where statutory rights are
involved if the agreement does not evidence a transaction "involving commerce"
as defined by current federal precedent without running afoul of Perry. Given the
reach of "involving commerce," however, any such approach will affect very few
cases. The California Supreme Court has followed the logic of McMahon without
discussing Perry or the application of its relevant discussion to cases "involving
commerce" within the meaning of the FAA. In Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase,62 the
leading California case on the standard of arbitration award review, the court
rejected language in prior decisions suggesting that an "error of law apparent on the
face of the award" provides grounds for review and specified that the grounds
delineated in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1286.2 are exclusive.63
Upon so holding, however, it stated the following:
59. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (including a lengthy opinion by
Judge Edwards, who has written extensively concerning the suitability of arbitration for statutory claims).
60. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
61. Id at489.
62. 3 Cal. 4th 1, 832 P.2d 899, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183 (1992). This case involved a lawyer and a law firm.
Although the issue was not raised, it is highly likely that the business of the firm would have met Allied-Bruce's
test for "involving commerce."
63. la at 33, 832 P.2d at 919, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
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We recognize that there may be some limited and exceptional circum-
stances justifying judicial review of an arbitrator's decision when a party
claims illegality affects only a portion of the underlying contract. Such
cases would include those in which granting finality to an arbitrator's
decision would be inconsistent with the protection of a party's statutory
rights. 64
Consistent with this view, in Board ofEducation v. Round Valley Teachers'Ass'n,65
the court found that an arbitrator's award was inconsistent with exclusive statutory
specifications regarding the causes and procedures applicable to reelection of pro-
bationary teachers and was, therefore, subject to judicial review.
Can Moncharsh be squared with Perry? If so, could the legislature adopt a
general statute providing for a higher standard of review over state law statutory
claims resolved by arbitrators than the general standard in California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1286.2? Seemingly, this would simply do in a single place what
Moncharsh says could be done in each individual state statute creating substantive
rights. If the federal impediment to this approach is insurmountable, could the legis-
lature create incentives for private parties to contractually agree in their arbitration
agreements to a higher standard of judicial scrutiny when state statutory claims are
resolved?66
V. CENTRAL CONTENTIONS BEARING ON POSSIBLE REFORMS
There is ample conflicting opinion regarding the need for reform of any sort
(beyond concern over capacity to survive preemption). What follows summarizes
some of the key arguments elaborated upon in the debate by Symposium
participants.
A. Key Arguments of Arbitration Proponents Who Disfavor Reform
(1) Parties may secure a more prompt resolution via arbitration because
individual arbitrator availability controls scheduling rather than court congestion.
Rejoinder: This is fine in theory, but if a chosen arbitrator delays
significantly in issuing a decision, parties who have failed to build time
64. Id. at32 (emphasis added) (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)).
65. 13 Cal. 4th 269,914 P.2d 193,52 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1996).
66. One court has upheld and honored a contractual clause providing for de novo review of "errors of law,"
Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995), and another has declined to follow such
a clause on the ground that it is "offensive to the public policy which supports arbitration," Lapine Tech. Corp. v.
Kyocera Corp., 909 F. Supp. 697, 706 (N.D. Ca. 1995). California Code of Civil Procedure § 1296 currently states
that "[i]f the agreement so provides," courts will review for errors of law in awards growing out of construction
contracts with public agencies.
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limits into their arbitration agreement have no remedy. 67 Even when
resolution is faster, faster is not always better. 8
(2) The informality of arbitration makes it more accessible for complainants
because there is less litigation expense.6 9 They may contemplate pursuing a claim
without a lawyer even if the stakes are not high enough to attract a contingency fee
lawyer or warrant paying hourly fees.
Rejoinder: That supports making it available as an option after disputes
arise, but not mandating pre-dispute agreements on this exclusive process.
Informality is a two-edged sword. It may make participation easier, but it
may make access to the information needed to effectively present one's
case harder. Without formal discovery, a complainant may not be able to
make his or her case.
Comeback: In California, all arbitrators may issue subpoenas
(including duces tecum) and make arrangement for inspection of
documents prior to hearing. A substantial number of agreements
incorporate standard rules, such as the National Rules for the
Resolution of Employment Disputes, promulgated by the AAA (June
1, 1996) specifying even broader authority on the part of the arbitrator
to order discovery (AAA Employment Rule 7).
(3) Those with expertise in the field of dispute may be selected as arbitrators
affording efficiency for presentation and a better informed decision. For example,
a dispute about construction defects can be presented more readily to an arbitrator
with background knowledge about usual construction methods than to a generalist
judge or jury.
Rejoinder: That's fine for parties that have the information necessary to
evaluate the experience and neutrality of possible arbitrators. When a single
67. In Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 134, 152 (1995) (declining to bar
enforcement on grounds of fraud in the inducement or unconscionability), the court noted that, on average, it takes
863 days to reach a hearing in a Kaiser arbitration. This statistic did not account for any additional time necessary
to reach a decision.
68. See supra Part III.B1, 2, & 3.
69. For eighteen years, Michigan experimented with a statutory structure intended to promote arbitration
of medical malpractice claims and yet build in protections forconsumers as a means to reduce malpractice insurance
premiums. Under that statute, cases were more quickly resolved than in court (an average of 19 months as opposed
to 35 months), but average litigation expenses were almost identical ($17,509 for arbitration vs. $17,798 for court
cases). John P. Desmond, Comment. Michigan's Medical Malpractice Reform Revisited-Tighter Damage Caps
and Arbitration Provisions, I IT. M. COOLEY L. REv. 159, 183 n.124 (1994).
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consumer has a complaint against a recurring respondent, however, any
prospective arbitrator with relevant experience is likely to have had past
dealings with the respondent but will have had none with the complainant.
Moreover, no public information is available. The desire for future dealings
with respondent may also imperil objectivity.7"
Comeback: Lawyers who specialize in complainant cases for any given
field can help balance the equation and gain, over time, knowledge
about qualifications of prospective arbitrators.
(4) Freedom to contract should be preserved. Professor Ware argues that
consumers receive some quid pro quo for signing arbitration agreements.
Rejoinder: There is a need to define some means of empirically testing
whether consumers are actually enjoying any increased services or saved
costs in industries where arbitration has become prevalent. Symposium
participants gave differing perspectives.
B. Some Leading Arguments of Arbitration Detractors Favoring Reform
(1) Where respondents are repeat players and complainants typically are not,
arbitrators have a built-in motive to prefer respondents because they desire to
cultivate future business 71 Professor Bingham's article summarizes her research on
the "repeat player" effect in non-union employment cases.
Rejoinder: Arguably, Professor Bingham's Table 4 (when compared to
Table 2) shows that the limiting effects of employment handbooks
(specifying available claims and remedies) has had more influence on
results than an employer's "repeat player" status.
(2) Arbitration of statutory claims does not adequately protect individual rights
because qualifications of arbitrators vary considerably,72 and there is no public
scrutiny as in the case of judicial appointments. The, extreme deference to arbit-
70. See supra Part III.B.I.
71. See Carole Gould, Securities ADR: Is it Fair to Investors?; 10 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF
COURT 165, 167-68 (1992) (describing an investor disgruntled to learn that her arbitrator had another case pending
with the same defendant whose lack of confidence in the process was confirmed by an award in her favor for much
less than the proven damages).
72. Judge Edwards reported an empirical study in 1976 indicating that 16% of labor arbitrators have never
read ajudicial opinion involving Title VII, 40% do not keep abreast of current developments under Title VII, and
yet 50% of those in these groups deem themselves fit to hear employment discrimination cases. Harry T. Edwards,
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, in PROC. OF THE 28TH ANN. MEETING OF
THENAT'LAcAD. OFARB. 59,71-72(1976).
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ration decisions under prevailing law forecloses this from constituting an adequate
safeguard.
Rejoinder: The vast majority of individual cases do not raise complex
issues of law, but rather call for application of established law to facts.
Arbitrators are ds expert in this function as trial judges and more expert
than juries.
(3) Arbitration of statutory claims does not adequately protect public rights
because the privacy of arbitration: (1) eliminates harm to public image as one
incentive for compliance with statutory goals; (2) makes it harder to demonstrate
a pattern or practice of violations warranting harsher penalties; and (3) deprives the
public of useful precedents that could guide other entities subject to statutory
regulation.
Rejoinder: "[The parties to an arbitral agreement knowingly take the risks
of error of fact or law committed by the arbitrators and.., this is a worthy
'trade-off' in order to obtain speedy decisions by experts in the field whose
practical experience and worldly reasoning will be accepted as correct by
other experts. 73
Comeback: The rejoinder assumes voluntary choice, which simply is
all too often not the case when a patient, bank customer, or other
consumer is presented with an arbitration agreement routinely used by
all service providers in an industry.
The work of Professors Ware and Bingham appearing in this issue elaborates
upon several of the key issues noted above.
73. Joseph C. Sweeney, Judicial Review ofArbitral Proceedings, 5 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 253,254 (1981-
82), cited and relied upon in Moncharsh, supra note 44, at 12.
